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ABSTRACT 
 
The monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council are thriving today, despite the 
decline of monarchies everywhere else in the world. I explore the significant factors that 
allow these countries to maintain monarchy as a viable governing system. I find that Gulf 
Cooperation Council states employ a diverse set of tools to control the populace and 
provide stability. These tools include generous social welfare programs, a repressive state 
security apparatus, a large guest worker population, and strong ties and cooperation with 
other gulf monarchies. Using these tools allows these states to overcome the political 
challenges that threaten monarchical stability in our time.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A group of monarchs in the Khaliji, or Gulf region of the Middle East, are 
thriving in the current world system. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates all have monarchs who rule in name and in practice, a curious, 
and possibly exceptional, subset of authoritarian regimes. In fact, these monarchies are 
the only remaining regional monarchy set in the world, where the monarchs are indeed 
the acting heads of state, with real governing power and authority. These countries have 
banded together to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Most published political 
science and history literature regarding authoritarian states or resistance to 
democratization in the Middle East focuses on these countries’ authoritarian status rather 
than their monarchical singularity. This thesis places the resilience of GCC monarchies as 
a central issue to be addressed. 
The King’s Dilemma illuminates that the centralized power of a monarchy will be 
very effective at promoting modernization, which in turn will lead citizens living in a 
modernized world to demand more participation in the government (Huntington 1968). 
These calls for greater political freedoms will force kings into a political dilemma: Give 
up power or clamp down on citizens with repression. It describes a world where 
monarchies eventually have no place, falling under the weight of their own success or 
losing many of the benefits of modernization that the monarchy was so effective at 
producing (Huntington 1968). Huntington’s vision has been largely vindicated, as most 
monarchical powers have given way to either democratic or non-monarchy authoritarian 
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regimes. However, the Gulf Coast monarchs do not fit into Huntington’s modernizing 
vision. 
The spring of 2011 marked an era of change for many Middle Eastern regimes. 
Countrywide protests, commonly known as the Arab Spring, swept through the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region, a spark in the tinderbox of government 
resentment and poverty that led to the toppling of governments and the start of civil 
wars.  This movement led to the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, 
as well as civil war in Syria and Yemen. Protesters demanded better living conditions and 
more representation in Morocco, Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait. However, movements in 
these countries were either brutally stamped out (Bahrain), or these movements were met 
with concessions designed to appease the protesters. In Kuwait, the monarchy dissolved 
and replaced parliament, but remained unaffected in power and position. Moroccan 
protesters won the right to a newly drafted constitution and increased power for the prime 
minister. In Jordan, the king dissolved parliament and called for early elections to bring 
in a new cabinet that would address the complaints of the people.  
The Arab Spring provided us with a critical juncture through which we can 
observe the staying power of GCC monarchies. Yom and Gause argue that the “Arab 
Spring might just as well be called the Arab Republics’ Spring” (Yom and Gause 2012, 
pg. 74), because monarchies remained relatively stable while republican regimes in the 
region collapsed or experienced extensive reforms. How did GCC monarchs maintain 
their authority in the face of shifting regional and international winds during the Arab 
Spring?  
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Although there has been academic and popular press coverage of authoritarian 
persistence in Gulf countries, most of the published literature focuses on authoritarianism 
more generally and not on the exceptional cases of monarchies in the region and their 
resistance to change. Current literature regarding these monarchies discusses the 
exceptionalism of the monarchy institution as a regional set but most do not address the 
elements that make it unique amongst other authoritarian regimes in the region. The 
literature that does address monarchies specifically misses out on some of the key 
elements of monarchical sustainment. 
In this thesis, I explore why and how these monarchies are able to protect their 
institutions from the effects of the King’s Dilemma. To do this, I identify and discuss 
elements and characteristics of GCC monarchies that are unique to the country set. As 
Lisa Anderson suggests, I will search where the light shines (Anderson 2006) when 
looking at GCC monarchies, hoping to glean some insight about the robustness of these 
systems by observation first, then to hold them up against other systems in comparison. 
In other words, by identifying key elements that these monarchies have in common, I 
hope to establish which elements contribute to their political stability and political 
uniqueness.  
Somewhat surprisingly, I find that culture, specifically tribal/colonial histories 
and religious beliefs, are not significant factors that help us to account for the continued 
stability of the GCC monarchies. This is surprising because the broader debate in the US 
and Europe suggests that culture is a key element that undergirds authoritarian regimes in 
these countries.  
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Rather, I find that economic and institutional arrangements best explain regime 
stability. Key parts of my explanation include: (1) greater financial freedoms, (2) 
repressive state apparatus, (3) generous social policies for citizens, including an emphasis 
on state-provided educational plans, (4) presence of large numbers of low-skilled, 
expatriate workers, and (5) coordinated actions among the GCC. 
Citizens in GCC monarchies experience greater freedom from state-imposed 
financial burdens than almost any other countries in the world and are provided sweeping 
social welfare programs (Index of Economic Freedom 2016). The state members of the 
GCC have some of the highest financial freedom ratings of all countries in the world. 
Corruption in GCC monarchies is lower than in other MENA countries, often much 
lower. GCC monarchies are also, on average, more educated than their neighbors and 
have a higher than world average literacy rate (World Bank Education Report 2015, 
Human Development Index 2014).  
Part of Huntington’s theory would expect a more educated populace to advance 
the cause of modernization and hasten the downfall of a monarchy. Following this idea, I 
examine the education rates of citizens/residents in the GCC monarchies. Populations of 
GCC countries, contrary to what Huntington might have surmised, are more educated 
than other Middle Eastern countries and above average in the world education standings. 
GCC monarchies couple these social financial incentives with an effective, 
repressive state security apparatus that keeps budding political dissent in check. GCC 
states rank extremely low in the world for allowing political freedom or participation, and 
in the maintenance and provision of civil liberties.  
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In addition, GCC regimes are among the highest in the world in low-skilled, 
foreign contract expatriate workers (hereafter referred to as expatriates), allowing the 
monarchies to sidestep the King’s Dilemma with a passive majority and economic 
stability.  
Finally, GCC countries work together through security and economy to maintain 
stability and establish legitimacy, not only for their own regimes, but also for monarchy 
as a workable regime type in general. 
 
6 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the academic literature written in regard to governmental systems in the 
MENA and GCC regions deal with the absence of democratization rather than the 
presence of monarchy. GCC monarchies are thus often banded together with other 
authoritarian regimes for analysis. Although this kind of study certainly adds to our 
understanding, it does little to identify if or why monarchies are exceptional in this set. 
Many ideas have been put forth, though, to explain the strength of illiberal governments 
in MENA and the GCC. I will address these ideas and their contributions and 
shortcomings in explaining the extraordinary stability of GCC monarchies. 
Scholars point to a flexible blend of patrimonial control of the elite, extensive 
social programs for the masses, and an effective repressive state security system as the 
tools used by authoritarian regimes in the GCC countries as a good model for how to 
tame your citizens (Lucas 2004; King 2007; Bellin 2004; Schwarz 2008). But these 
characteristics are not unique to monarchies, as many Arab “republics” also utilize 
similar measures and systems. Additionally, this blueprint did not keep some of the Arab 
republics from falling during the Arab Spring. Despite extensive social welfare programs 
and an extremely robust state security apparatus, Ghaddafi’s Libya suffered a 
catastrophic failure. That is not to say that the GCC monarchies do not utilize these 
tactics, evidence suggests that they do, but there is something exceptional about the 
monarchies that makes them more effective at it. 
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Kamrava and O’Mara compare GCC countries with South American countries, 
claiming that it is a lack of historical civil society institutions that has prevented the 
spread of democracy (Kamrava and O’Mara 1998). They argue that civil society 
institutions provide a will and foundation for the types of institutional structures 
necessary for the transition to a successful democracy. But a lack of robust sets of civil 
society institutions has not stopped democratization in other regions. Former Soviet 
republics were largely without the independent, democratically operated civil society 
organizations that Kamrava and O’Mara cite as essential to democratic transition but 
these countries succeeded in maintaining democratic transition and sustainment. Because 
this comparison only looks at the Middle East and Latin America it missed the cases 
outside its analysis that seem to disagree. In other words, while Kamrava and O’Mara’s 
observations certainly add much to the discussion of why some states successfully 
transitioned to democracy, it struggles to fully explain why others didn’t.  
Anderson argues that there is no exceptionalism to GCC monarchies, only that 
they are newer monarchies and have not yet reached the tipping point predicted by 
Huntington in Political Order in Changing Societies (Anderson 1991). This point is 
unique in that it denies that there could be any situation within the monarchical spectrum 
that might succeed in maintaining power. But a quarter of a century has passed since her 
assessment and the monarchs still rule. Additionally, if monarchies consistently maintain 
a higher threshold, this does seem to indicate some measure of exceptional status.  
From 1991 to present, GCC countries have continued to use their power to push 
through extensive modernization and education efforts. Nearly every GCC country has 
seen its Human Development Index score increase since 1991, which is around the same 
8 
 
 
 
amount of modernization effort as seen in countries such as Mexico and Brazil (Human 
Development Index 2014). This makes it less likely that the Huntington’s axe is still 
hanging over the heads of these monarchs and more likely that there is something unique 
about the way they operate. Finally, other monarchies established during the same period 
as GCC monarchies have toppled, while GCC monarchies have thrived, leaving little 
doubt that monarchical maturity is not the culprit. 
Another popular theme in the discussion of political systems in the Middle East is 
the effect of culture on the suppression of democratization and the resilience of 
authoritarianism. Fukuyama claims “that what happens on the level of ideology will 
depend on developments at the levels of civil society and culture” (Fukuyama 1995, pg. 
6). Huntington believed “as countries modernize they seek refuge from the modern world 
in their traditional, parochial cultures and religions” (Huntington 1996, abstract). Putnam 
explores whether culture has a hand in the success or failure of institutions (Putnam 
1993). 
However, these articles also highlight another problem with attempting to explain 
the lack of democratic movement in Arab states: The diverse cultural norms and societal 
institutions and varied interpretations of religion within Arab countries. To attempt to 
pass off all GCC countries as culturally homogenous ignores vast linguistic, religious, 
tribal, and historical differences. For instance, the shared tribal experiences of the desert 
Bedouin in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia vary greatly from the international trade centered 
cultures of Bahrain and Oman. Bahrain alone is only approximately 70% Muslim, and the 
majority of those Muslims practice Shi’a Islam, whereas neighboring Saudi Arabia is 
majority Sunni. Oman practices Ibadi Islam, which is separate from both Sunni and Shi’a 
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orthodoxy. This may not seem a significant cultural difference but these differing sects of 
Islam represent an ideological disagreement that affects historical analysis, governance, 
and everyday traditions. Therefore, a closer look at the culture of these six countries 
suggests that there is a significant diversity of culture and religious organization.  As a 
result, it is not possible to identify a specific cultural trait that might explain the stability 
of these monarchies. 
The littoral states of the GCC have thousands of years of history of international 
involvement and trade (albeit, not as states presently constructed) and have deep colonial 
ties. Although they may share a language with countries like Saudi Arabia, their 
religious, historical, and economic traditions and institutions vary greatly. And although 
their official languages are shared, gulf dialects of Arabic, while mutually intelligible, are 
very diverse. These differences are even more marked when comparing urban and rural 
dialects. Put simply, the substantial variation across religion and tribal culture means that 
there is not a simple variable that can be used to explain this variation. And if there was 
something about Arab culture and Islam that contributed to stability of patriarchal rule, it 
has done a poor job of it, historically with other Arab monarchies, and in the present 
political scene with authoritarian Arab republics. 
Esposito and Piscatori refute the idea that Islam is incompatible with democracy, 
citing current marginal Islamic democracies like Turkey and the flexibility of religion in 
adapting to political systems (1991). They point out the non-democratic histories of 
Christianity and Judaism and the traditional liberalized shura councils found throughout 
Islamic history as evidence that Islam is not stuck on a non-democratic deterministic path 
(Esposito and Piscatori 1991). Certainly, acceptance of a single, omnipotent ruler in the 
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past does not preclude acceptance of democracy in the future. And, if belief in a vertical 
religious power structure and adherence to a single religious ruler would prevent a people 
to refute democracy, one would expect modern democracy to have budded from India or 
Africa instead of Christian (and monotheistic) Europe and North America.  
Lucas and Anderson also refute the idea that the monotheistic focus of Islam and 
the traditional vertical tribal hierarchy of Arab culture serve as a buttress against political 
change by pointing out that the kingly system of GCC monarchies is a new invention and 
not a traditional institution. The monarchies were aided and assisted by the West to place 
monarchs who write themselves into the history of the state (Anderson 1991; Lucas 
2004). Not only are the borders of most Arab countries a result of colonial interference 
such as the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, but many current dynasties are in place either 
because of colonial ratification (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait) or direct colonial 
appointment (Jordan, Iraq). Some of these countries have been overthrown and others 
have not, with the monotheistic focus of Islam and the vertical tribal hierarchy having 
negligible effect. 
The history of the ruling families of the GCC countries is one largely shaped by 
association with the United Kingdom. Although many of these dynasties have histories as 
rulers going back to the 17th century, they did not always rule as monarchs and certainly 
did not rule over the same territory that is claimed under their stewardship today. Even 
the names of their kingdoms differ now from tradition. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud would not 
have gained control of most of the Arabian Peninsula without the military and financial 
assistance of the British, as well as territorial concessions gained from them after the fall 
of the Ottoman Empire in World War One.  
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The British placed the sons of Hussein bin Ali (who had fought alongside T.E. 
Lawrence) as kings on the throne in Jordan and Iraq. Britain also helped establish the 
Sabah family as rulers of modern day Kuwait and the Al Khalifa family as rulers of 
Bahrain. Oman was labeled as a British Protectorate in 1891. French forces forced the 
abdication of one of Hussein’s sons from Syria and helped establish the government 
there. The Treaty of Darin, Sykes-Picot agreement, and other Western-centric agreements 
largely determined the boundaries and rulers of these countries as little as one hundred 
years ago.  
Other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon, share the same colonially 
influenced roots and histories as the GCC countries. Some of them have succeeded in 
finding governmental stability and others have not. Some of the monarchies have lasted 
and some have been overthrown to see republics formed. Most telling, as many Arab 
monarchies have failed since their colonially inspired or supported inceptions as have 
succeeded. Monarchies in Tunisia, North Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Libya, and 
Afghanistan all failed. Because of this, it seems that the tribal histories and cultural 
underpinnings do not provide the bedrock for monarchical stability.  
Hinnebusch agrees that culture does not preclude democracy, but argues that it 
may lend support to authoritarian regimes under certain conditions by providing 
institutions that can be exploited by a ruler (Hinnebusch 2006). This speaks to the 
situation of GCC monarchies by expressing the idea that there may be exceptional 
circumstances under which GCC countries operate that allow them to use the same tools 
to achieve different ends. Hinnebush does not elaborate on those conditions, however, 
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other than to state that the machinations of colonial and post-colonial powers may have 
helped to create the openings in which the conditions might exist. 
Yom and Gause address the issue of Arab monarchical resilience specifically and 
not just authoritarianism, by refuting the ideas of influence by culture and institutional 
factors, and by advancing the theory that Arab monarchs are maintained by a 
mobilization of “cross-cutting coalitions,” high levels of hydrocarbon wealth, and 
patronage by wealthy foreign countries (Yom and Gause 2012). However, these same 
tools are also used by Arab republics, sometimes with a different result. Clearly there is 
something else at work.  
The next section of the thesis turns to the issue of how we will measure the 
stability of these regimes. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MEASUREMENT FACTORS 
To better account for the ongoing stability of the GCC monarchies, I incorporate 
five factors in my analysis: State Repression, State Imposed Financial Burdens, 
Education, Expatriate Populations, and the deliberate cooperation and interaction of GCC 
states. By examining these features together, we can gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the uncommon stability of the GCC monarchies. I use these factors to 
explain some of the unique power they have to increase regime stability. Of note, I 
examine each factor for a one-year time period and for comparative purposes, so I am 
using a smaller sample size than traditional econometric techniques would permit. 
Measuring State Repression 
To measure the degree to which each state represses its population I use data from 
the Freedom House report “Freedom in the World 2016.” This report rates each country 
in the world, assigning two major scores to reflect the Civil Liberties and Political Rights 
of the citizens of those countries. Those scores are averaged to assign the country a polity 
score, which is meant to reflect the overall freedom that country offers to its citizens. 
Countries are rated from 1 to 7, with the designation of Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 
to 5.0), and Not Free (5.5 to 7.0) reflecting an individual’s level of freedom in that 
country. As a reference, the United States holds a score of 1, while North Korea holds a 
score of 7. Brazil scores a 2, while Russia holds a score of 6. While not every element of 
the scoring is based off of government repression or lack of it, the polity score gives a 
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broad but overall accurate representation of the repressive (or liberal) experience of each 
country’s citizenry.  
Measuring State Imposed Financial Burdens 
The Index of Economic Freedom is a database that measures the overall economic 
freedom that a citizen or business can expect to experience in a given country. States are 
measured in four main areas: Rule of Law, Limited Government, Regulatory Efficiency, 
and Open Markets. Each of these criteria is further broken down, making a total of ten 
conditional scores. These ten scores are rated from 0 to 100, with a higher score denoting 
more freedom in that respective area. The Index of Economic Freedom considers a score 
from 100 to 80 as Free, 79.9 to 70 as Mostly Free, 69.9 to 60 as Moderately Free, 59.9 to 
50 as Mostly Unfree, and anything under 49.9 as Repressed. 
I focus on the degree to which a state imposes a financial burden on the individual 
citizen. This burden is often felt in the forms of high taxes or a lack of significant social 
programs. To measure this, I take the Fiscal Freedom score, a sub-category of Limited 
Government. Fiscal Freedom is a reflection of the direct and indirect tax burdens imposed 
by the government. Like the overall Economic Freedom, the Fiscal Freedom score ranges 
from 0-100, with the higher score denoting a lower tax burden. For reference, the United 
States has a Fiscal Freedom score of 65.6, while North Korea scores 0. Brazil scores a 
69.7, while Russia has a score of 82.2.  
 also explore the rate of corruption as presented by the Corruption Perceptions 
Index developed by Transparency International. While not all corruption is based off of 
economics, a high level of corruption would certainly increase the financial burden felt 
by a country’s citizens and stifle trade and private opportunity. The Corruption 
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Perceptions Index ranks all countries in the world according to perceived levels of 
corruption, with top ranking countries exhibiting less corruption than lower ranking 
countries. 
Measuring Expatriate Populations 
When considering the effect of large expatriate populations in GCC monarchies I 
adopted three measurements. One is the percentage of a country’s population that is made 
up of expatriates. The second is the percentage of that country’s work force that is made 
up of expatriate workers. This gives us an idea of what percentage of the population is 
made up of expatriates and also how much of the country’s work burden is shouldered by 
that population. The third is the percentage of expatriate workers who work in low-skilled 
jobs. This number helps us to see what percentage of the expatriate population lives on 
low income and with marginal rights. This data is from 2013. 
Measuring Education in GCC Monarchies 
To measure the education rates of GCC monarchies I consulted the United 
Nations Human Development Index (HDI) and the 2015 World Bank Education Report. 
The HDI is an index based on the health (longevity), education (% of literate adults), and 
per capita income of a country. I singled out the education score for GCC monarchies. 
The United Nation Statistics Division explains that the education factor of the HDI is a 
calculation of the expected years of education of a school-age child and the average years 
of schooling in the adult population. This calculation is given in the form of a percentage, 
reflecting the percentage of the adult population who received the expected years of 
schooling. It gives an indication of the successfulness of educational efforts in the 
observed country.  
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The World Bank Education Report compiles raw data from many different 
educational fields. As a reflection of overall education rates in a country, I have chosen to 
use the Adult Literacy Percentage, which is simply a percentage of the country’s adult 
population (age 15 and up) that are literate. Literacy rates are reflective not only of the 
state’s ability to provide educational programs, but of the success of those programs. 
Since the statistics on literacy are collected by each individual country on their censuses, 
it is difficult to know whether the data refers to citizen or resident populations. While 
literacy rates might be more likely in some countries to contain expatriate worker 
populations, it is less likely that education score would contain this group since it is a 
statistic comparing years of education obtained compared to years of education planned 
by the state (since expatriate workers are mostly adults who are only allowed a limited 
stay).  
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CHAPTER THREE: OBSERVED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
Education 
Huntington argues that a more modernized country would produce a more 
educated populace, which would lead to unrest under the chafing rule of a monarch 
(1968). If that is true, one might expect GCC monarchies to keep their citizens in check 
by limiting education and educational opportunities. Instead, GCC monarchies are, on 
average, as educated or more educated than other Arab countries. Data from the 
Education Index of the UN Human Development Report shows that GCC monarchies are 
some of the most educated peoples of the MENA region. The following are the education 
scores for GCC monarchies in the 2014 Education Index section of the UN Human 
Development Report: 
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Table 1 HDI: Education in GCC countries, 2014 
Source:  UN Human Development Report 2014 
Compare these with other regional countries: 
Table 2 HDI: Education in other MENA countries 2014 
Country Education Index Score 
Libya .698 
Lebanon .631 
Yemen .339 
Egypt .573 
Syria .553 
Iraq .467 
Tunisia .621 
Iran .683 
Algeria .643 
Mean .579 
Lower Bound .490 
Upper Bound .667 
Country Education Index Score 
Bahrain .714 
Kuwait .646 
Oman .603 
Qatar .686 
Saudi Arabia .723 
UAE .673 
Mean .674 
Lower Bound .627 
Upper Bond .721 
19 
 
 
 
Source:  UN Human Development Report 2014 
Although there is not always a huge disparity between Arab republics and 
monarchies in education scores, Arab monarchies on average scored higher (and in some 
cases much higher) when Hungtington’s theoretical approach would suggest that stable 
monarchies would otherwise be expected to score lower.  
Perhaps monarchies simply have lower educational goals. To provide additional 
insight I decided to add the literacy rates of each country as well, to give a measure of the 
effectiveness of education in that country. These scores come from the UNESCO 
Literacy Report. The world average for literacy among adults (15 and over) is 86.3 per 
cent. This also gives us a more standardized benchmark for set comparison. 
Table 3 Literacy Rates in GCC countries 2015 
Country % 
Bahrain 95.7 
Kuwait 96.1 
Oman 94 
Qatar 97.8 
Saudi Arabia 94.8 
UAE 93 
Mean 95.2 
Lower Bound 93.4 
Upper Bond 97 
Source:  World Bank Education Report 2015 
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Table 4 Literacy Rates in other MENA countries 2015 
Country % 
Libya 91 
Lebanon 93.9 
Yemen 70.1 
Egypt 75.2 
Syria 86.4 
Iraq 79.7 
Tunisia 81.1 
Iran 87.2 
Algeria 79.6 
Mean 88.7 
Lower Bound 76.8 
Upper Bound 88.5 
Source:  World Bank Education Report 2015 
This data seems to conflict with the idea that monarchies would be less stable 
with an educated citizenry. It is a possibility that the government collapses and instability 
caused by the Arab Spring might have skewed the numbers, but unlikely since the 
numbers were similar from 2005 until present.  
Education is often viewed as a tool of modernization, though, and since 
monarchies are effective at modernizing countries it makes sense that stable monarchies 
would have higher education rates. This part of Huntington’s theory seems to be 
supported by this data. So far, so good, Huntington says. The divergence appears when 
we consider the result of this piece of modernization. It does not appear, at least in the 
cases of GCC monarchies, that education has led to an unruly and restive populace.  
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Thus, increasing levels of education should not be viewed as a natural precursor 
to democratization or political change in the case of GCC monarchies. Perhaps education 
is used as an entitlement, where it can be another tool that keeps middle class and elites in 
their social places. For instance, the government of Saudi Arabia supported a generous 
scholarship program in 2015 that allowed around 200,000 Saudi citizens to study abroad, 
including over 300 here at Boise State University. This kind of generous social program 
fulfills the needs of an elite class and establishes a large population that might be less 
eager to put such benefits at risk. Regardless, it seems that a high average standard of 
education is a marker of GCC monarchies. 
Expatriate Population 
When we think of the term expatriate, we often imagine the US citizens who are 
living abroad pursuing a career outside the US. While there certainly are many of these 
types of expatriates, the percentage of them compared to total US citizenship is quite 
small. We have expatriates of other countries living in the US, of course, who are not 
immigrants, but foreign workers on contracts who will someday return to their countries 
and who do not consider themselves as Americans. Again, the percentage of these 
workers is quite small relative to the total population. In some parts of the world, though, 
there are mass amounts of foreign workers, brought in for specific industries or types of 
work. 
After the discovery of massive oil reserves in the Gulf region, western oil 
companies (assisted by colonial powers) began massive infrastructure operations to take 
advantage of the new economic discovery. Following the economic model they had used 
in many other countries (and partly necessitated by the cultural taboo of manual labor in 
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the Middle East) oil companies began importing workers from Southeast Asia to work in 
the oil fields. This workaround provided the companies (and later, GCC regimes) with 
cheap labor and remained an essential part of the economic makeup of GCC regimes. As 
infrastructure and demand  
A large expatriate population means that a significant population in a country is 
beholden to the state or businesses for basic needs and economic opportunities. 
Expatriate populations working in a country are less likely to risk losing their opportunity 
by demanding increased political rights or attempting to influence political change. Low-
wage workers also generally have less education and often come from countries with 
equally repressive governments. If the percentage of expatriate population is high 
enough, they could prove to be a significant obstacle to political change and a boost to 
maintenance of status quo.  
Four of the five countries in the world with the highest percentage of expatriate 
populations working within their borders are GCC monarchies. GCC monarchies import 
workers by the millions in order to provide unskilled labor and prevent their own citizens 
from having to do “demeaning” work. In Arab culture, it is often considered 
embarrassing or disgraceful to have others see you perform manual labor (Nydell 2012). 
Even if someone has a hobby (for instance, fixing cars or building furniture) they will 
perform their work in their own homes, away from the eyes of their neighbors. The 
importing of unskilled labor workers, especially from the Philippines, Southeast Asia, or 
Pakistan, provides GCC monarchies with a cheap way to provide necessary labor. 
Expatriate workers do not just fill a cultural void, however, as they also provide 
an important economic tool. State-run resource companies and massive state-financed 
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infrastructure projects (which are part of the gamut of social provisions) demand low-
skilled labor workers who will work long hours for significantly lower wages than GCC 
citizens. It also allows GCC citizens to employ housekeepers, cooks, gardeners, builders 
and other culturally taboo positions at a bargain rate.  
However, the presence of a large expatriate population could also have significant 
political effects. Consider the expatriate percentages of the population of each GCC 
country.  
Table 5 Expatriate Population in GCC countries (percentage of total 
population) 
Country % 
Bahrain 55 
Kuwait 70 
Oman 46 
Qatar 88 
Saudi Arabia 33 
UAE 85 
Mean 62.8 
Lower Bound 39.7 
Upper Bound 85.8 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs report Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision 
Saudi Arabia is somewhat of an exception in this list, with only a third of their 
population coming from foreign contract workers. This is partly due to the large 
population (More than half of the GCC’s approximately 52 million citizens live in Saudi 
Arabia) that would require more raw numbers of expatriates to dilute, and partly due to 
the higher rural Saudi population. Saudi Arabia has also recently introduced initiatives to 
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provide more working opportunities for Saudi citizens, especially in areas where Islamic 
fundamentalism has taken root with the young, unemployed male populations. However, 
most of the new employment opportunities are not provided by replacing foreign workers 
with Saudi citizens, but by creating new state-controlled positions. This anomalous, but 
still very high number of foreign workers, is made even more significant by the 
percentage of expatriate workers who make up the actual Saudi work force.  
In some ways, GCC monarchies have found a way to bring back the serfdom 
conditions of monarchies in the Middle Ages, with a landed elite and a peasant class with 
no rights. If the King’s Dilemma relies on the voices of a country’s citizens to help bring 
about the social changes necessary to topple a monarchy, in many GCC monarchies it 
must rely on the voices of only 10-30% of its residents! Expatriate workers have few 
rights in GCC monarchies and can be expelled from the country for almost any reason.  
This means that GCC monarchies have imported unskilled laborers who rely on 
the monarchy (or state supported businesses and private elites) for their lives, jobs, and 
well-being. These same workers also keep GCC citizens complacent by performing 
unseemly and unpopular work while at the same time providing the average GCC citizen 
with someone to look down on so that he might feel good about his position in life. This 
is reflected even more when we look at the expatriate percentage of the work force for 
each country. 
Table 6 Percentage of GCC Work Force Made up of Expatriate Population 
Country % 
Bahrain 79 
Kuwait 83 
Oman 80 
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Qatar 94 
Saudi Arabia 56 
UAE 93 
Mean 81 
Lower Bound 66.4 
Upper Bound 95.3 
Source: Forstenlechner and Rutledge 
An average of 81% of the work force of GCC countries has no citizenship, no 
political rights whatsoever, and no prospect at influencing government change. Consider 
the economic effect that this might have. Think of the political power and influence 
wielded by unions and worker’s rights groups in the United States. In essence, the people 
who are most impacted by a GCC monarchy’s lack of rights have little or no ability to 
complain about it! GCC countries have essentially made citizenship itself an elite status 
and have ensured that non-elite non-citizens would have no ability to complain about it. 
Passports are carefully controlled by the government and employers. 
Additionally, many of these laborers work to support large families in their home 
countries, providing for them in a way that would be impossible elsewhere. The 
opportunity to be in GCC countries and earn this kind of income coupled with 
responsibilities to families make dissent very unlikely.  
The majority of these workers are imported to work in low-skilled positions. This 
low-skilled labor group is best illustrated by inspecting how much of the expatriate work 
force in each country is employed in positions that do not require education or special 
training. 
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Table 7 Percentage of Expatriate Workers in Low-Skilled Jobs in GCC 
Countries 
Country % 
Bahrain 88 
Kuwait 81 
Oman 87 
Qatar 83 
Saudi Arabia 85 
UAE 65 
Mean 82 
Lower Bound 72 
Upper Bound 90 
Source: IMF Report 2011 
When I lived in Bahrain, I could call Dairy Queen and order an Oreo Blizzard and 
within minutes an expatriate worker on a motorbike would show up at my door with ice 
cream. This kind of convenience comes at a price, but it is not a price that burdens the 
citizens of GCC countries. When the working class consists of a majority population with 
no rights, depending on the government for even their existence in the country and the 
elite classes have access to cheap labor and government entitlements, what motivation do 
the people have to demand a change? This seems to be condition unforeseen by 
Huntington, which allows GCC monarchies to work around the King’s Dilemma. Not 
only does it provide a politically passive majority, but it assists the monarchy in 
maintaining the economic power necessary to run a state security apparatus and guarantee 
essential social welfare programs. 
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Fiscal Freedom 
Used hand-in-hand with state repression (the stick and the carrot), a low tax 
burden and generous social programs are also effective strategies that permit these 
monarchies to maintain control. A people who have nothing asked of them and 
everything provided by their government are in a much weaker position to ask for any 
type of representation. They are also much less likely to attempt any change of the status 
quo. 
Citizens of GCC monarchies enjoy extraordinary fiscal freedom from state-
imposed financial burdens. Taxes in GCC countries are extremely low and state-provided 
entitlements are high. All GCC monarchies place in the top 50 of GDP per capita, with 
Qatar ranking as the number one country in the world with a GDP per capita of 
$102,100.  This number includes the expatriate workers whose salaries are much lower 
than GCC citizens. For instance, taking the expatriate workers from the equation in Qatar, 
the GDP per citizen is closer to $690,000. The 2016 Index of Economic Freedom 
illustrates just how exceptional these countries are by highlighting their lack of tax 
burden in the Fiscal Freedom score. This is scored from 1-100, with a higher score 
indicating a lower tax burden imposed by the government. 
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Table 8 Index of Economic Freedom Fiscal Freedom Score 2015 
Country Fiscal Freedom Score 
Bahrain 99.9 
Kuwait 97.7 
Oman 98.5 
Qatar 99.7 
Saudi Arabia 99.7 
UAE 95 
Source: 2016 Index of Economic Freedom 
In comparison, the United States scored a 65.6 in Fiscal Freedom, China a 69.7. 
From this we can see that citizens of GCC monarchies are not asked to contribute very 
much to the government in the form of taxes. This score, of course, goes hand in hand 
with the Freedom Index score, since citizens who are not asked to contribute to the state 
are in a weaker position to ask for representation. Keeping taxes low and providing 
sweeping entitlements can also be viewed as a tactic to keep the people complacent. If the 
state is providing for their immediate needs, what more could most citizens ask for and 
why bother to be politically involved? And if they did become politically motivated, what 
leverage would they have over their government? High fiscal freedom also serves to cater 
to elite classes, preventing them from using influence to threaten or affect the monarchy. 
GCC monarchies regularly use social programs as a buttress against social change. 
A high fiscal freedom score almost always (and certainly in the cases of GCC 
monarchies) is accompanied by a high percentage of the GDP produced by a single or a 
few valuable resources. In the cases of GCC monarchies, this resource is oil, although 
some have begun to specialize in financial fields and tourism as a supplement or failsafe 
against single resource reliance. Bahrain, in particular, has been forced to step away from 
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oil reliance as Bahraini oil reserves have been used up. In this case, Bahrain has relied 
heavily on GCC subsidies and aid (mostly from Saudi Arabia) and from US and British 
support (in exchange for military cooperation and use of Naval Air Station Bahrain and 
Isa Air Base). Without these resource funds (or significant foreign aid), GCC monarchies 
would not be able to utilize the tools of fiscal freedom and state repression in order to 
stave off political instability. 
Table 9 Corruption Perceptions Rankings of GCC Countries 
Country Corruption Perception Ranking 
Bahrain 70 
Kuwait 75 
Oman 64 
Qatar 31 
Saudi Arabia 62 
UAE 24 
Mean 54.3 
Lower Bound 31.9 
Upper Bound 76.8 
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International 
Table 10 Corruption Perceptions Rankings of Non-GCC MENA Countries 
Country % 
Libya 170 
Lebanon 136 
Yemen 170 
Egypt 108 
Syria 173 
Iraq 166 
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Tunisia 75 
Iran 131 
Algeria 108 
Mean 137.4 
Lower Bound 110.4 
Upper Bound 164.5 
Source: Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, Transparency International 
Tables 9 and 10 illustrate that the perceived levels of corruption in GCC 
monarchies are far lower than their non-monarchy counterparts. In fact, the lowest 
MENA non-monarchy, Tunisia, while ranked far ahead of its peers, is still only equal to 
the worst ranked GCC country. Qatar and UAE both fall outside of the standard deviation 
for corruption perceptions of GCC countries (but on the higher-ranking side). UAE in 
particular, has the highest corruption ranking of all MENA countries, GCC or not. Heavy 
involvement in international banking require higher oversight, which may be a 
contributing factor. No one wants a corrupt government handling their money. 
Outliers from MENA non-GCC countries include Tunisia on the high-ranking end 
and Syria and Libya on the low. Tunisia has weathered a fairly successful and smooth 
governmental transition as a result of the Arab Spring, while Syria and Libya are still 
locked in lawlessness and conflict.  
The data suggests that monarchies are less corrupt than republics. Keep in mind 
that this “perceived” corruption is not necessarily a reflection of the opinions of its 
populace, but scored and determined by an unbiased NGO. Monarchies could be ripe for 
corrupt activities, including nepotism and kleptocratic activities, but seem to forego them 
in favor of more sound and acceptable policies. Perhaps as GCC countries have shown 
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more stability, this has eliminated the need for back channels and non-regulated markets. 
Or maybe monarchies simply have more effective security apparatus with a mandate for 
eliminating competition for government institutions. 
Political Freedom 
A low tax burden often translates into a lesser chance for political representation. 
The Freedom House Freedom Index measures political participation as well as civil 
liberties. Repression has long been used by resource-dependent countries to maintain elite 
power, suppress the agents of government change, and deter proponents of government 
transparency. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries rate poorly on the Freedom 
House Freedom Index. Kuwait scores best as the only GCC country rated “Partly Free”, 
while all other countries rate as “Not Free”. This is likely because of Kuwait’s legislature, 
which has more power and influence than any councils or legislatures in the other GCC 
countries, but is still quite limited and only marginally powerful in comparison to the 
royal family. The Freedom in the World index is scored on a scale from 1 to 7, with a 
lower score indicating more freedom. 
Table 11 Freedom Index 2016 Scores 
Country Freedom Index Score 
Bahrain 6.5 
Kuwait 5 
Oman 5.5 
Qatar 5.5 
Saudi Arabia 7 
UAE 6 
Source: Freedom in the World 2016 
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These scores indicate that GCC monarchies do not allow political participation on 
any significant level. Opposition parties, if they are allowed to exist, are persecuted, 
stymied, or co-opted by the ruling family (Norton 1993). Aside from Kuwait, legislatures 
are subject to dissolution by royal decree and constitutions are subject to revision or 
dismissal. Political protest is not allowed and sometimes met with violence (Bahrain) or 
criminalization (Saudi Arabia). Citizens are not allowed to criticize the government and 
especially not the monarchy, and these rules are often punishable by prison sentences or 
death. In Bahrain, it is a crime to even deface a photo of members of the royal family.  
Political participation is not the only area where GCC monarchies score poorly. 
Monarchies in the Gulf also have generally poor human rights records. Minorities are 
routinely abused or neglected and extra-judicial punishments are common. Religious 
persecution is common, and regime leaders and political considerations often influence 
the decisions of courts. 
A lack of political freedom is certainly not a factor unique to GCC monarchies, 
but it is certainly an identifying characteristic. Because every GCC country limits 
personal freedoms and civil liberties it may indicate that repression and lack of 
representation are key elements to the maintenance of a successful GCC monarchy. In 
other words, GCC monarchies are not the only governments limiting freedoms, but every 
GCC monarchy does. 
Monarchical Diffusion 
In 1996 O’Loughlin, Ward, Lofdahl, Cohen, Brown, Reilly, Gleditsch, and Shin 
produced a paper studying the spatial aspects of the spread of democracy and autocracy. 
They concluded that there are indeed clusters of democratic and autocratic regimes and 
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that study of governmental change should take place by viewing the world as “regional 
mosaics” (O’Loughlin et al 1996). GCC countries have self-sorted into a regional mosaic 
of monarchies, described by Yom as “pan-royal”, and who responded as a unified group 
in the face of shifting political ideas during the Arab Spring (Yom 2016). This indicates 
that cooperation between GCC countries and inter-operational dealings may have an 
influence on regime stability.  
Some of this may simply be the legitimacy of similar institutions. Monarchies 
may seem strange and outdated to someone in the United States, but to a Qatari citizen, 
who is not only ruled over by a king, but surrounded by countries ruled by kings, this 
arrangement is quite normal. This is reflected not just in their country of citizenship but 
also in their regional trading, border-sharing, and military partners. Additionally, these 
countries are those with which they share the most culturally and linguistically. To many 
GCC citizens, non-monarchies represent a demographic of “others”. 
This associative support of monarchies is not just passive, however, as GCC 
countries regularly take an active role in the support of stability for regional partners. 
During the Arab Spring, when Bahrain experienced a more significant political revolt at 
the Pearl Uprising (named so for the location of the demonstrations at the Pearl 
Roundabout), Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent a force of around 1500 military troops 
across the King Fahd Causeway (which links Bahrain and Saudi Arabia) to suppress the 
demonstrations and end any conversation about a new constitution or government 
overthrow. 
GCC countries also enjoy unique trading status amongst other members and oil-
poor countries (like Bahrain) receive huge sums of monetary support from other GCC 
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countries. In fact, not only do GCC countries support financial stability within the 
monarchies of the GCC, they also spend enormous sums helping to maintain stability in 
other monarchies. Two countries outside of the Gulf region enjoy significant financial 
support from the GCC and have even entertained overtures of GCC membership: Jordan 
and Morocco. Both are monarchies. Perhaps recognizing the value of stabilizing the 
legitimacy of monarchies as a ruling type, the GCC has reached out to these countries 
even though in many other ways (geography, resources) they are very dissimilar from 
current membership. 
This suggests that part of the reason this set of monarchies has been maintained is 
because they are a set of monarchies. This explanation does not provide a full answer to 
the question, as there are monarchies in the region who have fallen through public action 
or military coup, but in line with the thinking of O’Loughlin et al, the GCC may derive 
some political legitimacy from their unique regional mosaic. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSIONS 
My goal in examining the GCC monarchies has been to identify key 
characteristics of these countries as a political group that explain monarchical regime 
stability. By doing this, I identified the unique features that contribute to their resilience, 
particularly in a region known for its instability. This list of features is not all inclusive, 
of course, as there are surely other factors singular to this set of countries and some 
singular to each country individually that assist in maintaining the regimes. There is 
something unique about this set, though, and by observing it for what it is we can better 
understand what holds it together.  
I have found that GCC monarchs utilize a diverse toolset that enables them to 
avoid the King’s Dilemma as presented by Samuel Huntington. GCC monarchs limit 
political freedoms, provide extensive social programs and above average educational 
opportunities, and employ a resident majority of expatriate workers. Their tactics can be 
very effective as either spot treatment tactics (Saudi Arabia placating the population with 
new financial incentives during the Arab Spring or Bahrain calling on GCC powers to 
crush a rebellion), or as long-standing stabilizing policies (Qatari and Kuwaiti citizen 
stipends) in the maintenance of regime control.  
As I have discussed the interrelations of the GCC countries as an important factor 
contributing to stability, so too has the interoperability of the characteristics themselves 
been essential in maintaining monarchy. Sweeping social programs and a low tax burden 
(positive reinforcement) are most effective when paired with an efficient state security 
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apparatus limiting political dissent (negative reinforcement). Education seems to 
contribute to the stability of a monarchy, but perhaps only insomuch that it is a reward or 
entitlement given to the citizenry by a patriarchal monarch. Education also represents a 
social delineation between the educated citizens and the less educated low-skill workers 
who make up the bulk of the work force. 
Implicit to the success of these strategies, too, lies the economic factor. Without 
significant funding (provided mainly by oil revenue in the case of the GCC) the state 
would not be able to provide social programs or utilize the light touch of a minimized 
state imposed financial burden. Without deep government pockets regimes would also 
struggle to maintain a successful repressive security apparatus essential to maintaining 
political control. This stick and carrot approach provides a flexible spectrum of options 
when demonstrations or revolt appear, as in 2011 when Saudi Arabia rolled out new 
welfare and employment programs in the face of the Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia while 
sending troops to help quell political upheaval in Bahrain. 
The expatriate population plays an important role in this balancing act, providing 
an army of cheap, low-skilled labor that keeps royal coffers full. Not only do regimes get 
cheap labor to help turn a profit but they get to do it without providing the same suite of 
programs and benefits that they provide to their citizens (which are, in some cases, a huge 
minority in their own country). Expatriate populations also provide the regime with 
bodies that work without presenting any significant threat to the status quo, as they can be 
removed from the country with almost no backlash. 
This financial security is so important that GCC countries are willing to contribute 
huge sums of money to each other to ensure the system can be run as it is designed. GCC 
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countries will even contribute to like-minded systems outside of the GCC, as in the cases 
of Jordan and Morocco, in order to present the image of viability and legitimacy of the 
monarchical system. Perhaps this is because they see any weakness of any monarchy as 
affecting their own legitimacy.  
To this effect, there may be little room for error. The system provides monarchs 
with a toolbox of political management that other authoritarian regimes may not have 
access to, but if there are significant enough economic troubles political spaces may have 
to be created. Jordan and Kuwait have both experienced financial troubles in the past, and 
in both cases, were forced to give power to parliaments and open new political dialogues. 
With oil prices crashing in the past few years Saudi Arabia has been forced to cut back or 
cancel some of the social programs that their citizens had previously enjoyed. This leads 
to fears that those political spaces could be filled by opportunistic Islamic extremist 
groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who have shown themselves more than willing 
to provide benefits to those whom the government has “forgotten.” 
The bedrock of a strong and flexible monarchy appears to be a strong economy 
(heavily dependent on expatriate workers, and low tax burden) and elite institutions 
(security apparatus, education, social welfare programs, low corruption, and interregional 
cooperation). Culture may have an ancillary effect, in that it infuses the institutions with 
some understood legitimacy, but is in itself not a significant factor of monarchy 
maintenance. The survival of GCC monarchies very likely has to do with both the luck of 
exceptional resource availability and the opportunistic nature of this particular brand of 
monarchy. Cooperation and maintenance of a like-minded regional support system has 
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allowed GCC monarchies after the fact to react to threats and build legitimacy, 
establishing themselves as a flexible and durable regime type. 
Ultimately, there seems to be a strong level of buy-in by GCC citizens regarding 
monarchies. This is illustrated by that critical juncture of the Arab Spring, where GCC 
countries (even Bahrain) saw significantly less political turmoil than most other countries 
in the region. Additionally, 5 of the 6 GCC countries were listed in the top 50 of the 
World Happiness Report 2013-2015 (Oman, the only GCC country not listed in the top 
50, was absent from the report). Algeria was the only other MENA country in the top 50 
and there were no other MENA countries in the top 65. This is not surprising, given the 
GCC’s strong track record of stability in an increasingly unstable part of the world. 
Stability breeds stability and it could be that these countries, once reaching a benchmark 
of continuity, established their own legitimacy that others failed to achieve only because 
they failed to maintain the same continuity. This in itself is exceptional. 
GCC monarchies have shown remarkable stability. This is why the recent 
tribulations in the Middle East have given us an opportunity to examine the exceptional 
preparatory and reactionary methods used by GCC monarchies. If stability is threatened, 
GCC monarchies have a diverse set of tools available to restabilize and reestablish the 
status quo. GCC monarchies have managed to use these tools to balance the benefits of 
modernization while maintaining flexibility of governance, and will continue to do so as 
long as they have access to them.  
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